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INTRODUCTION
Constitutionalism promises norms and structures that hold states
accountable for their actions. These norms and strategies vary from state
to state. In 1982, Canada adopted a Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
which entrenched new constitutional norms and strategies.' In addition,
the 1982 reforms declare that the Constitution, including the Canadian
Charter, is "supreme law." 2 Throughout the intervening decades, courts
have relied on this declaration to judicially review government activity.
Thus, the promise of constitutionalism is alive and well in Canada.
Whether constitutionalism's norms and structures are available to
women, however, is debatable. According to feminist scholars, they
should be. Helen Irving depicts recent constitutional reforms
incorporating bills of rights as "fresh starts."3  She maintains that in
Western countries one of the most striking things about these "fresh
starts" is the extent to which they reflect "gender awareness."4  The
Canadian Charter is no exception. Although lacking specific reference to
gender, it contains two sex equality provisions. 5 The first is section 15,
which is treated as rights-bearing, and the second is section 28, which is
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter or
the Constitution Act].
2. Id. The Canadian Charter is found at §§ 1-34 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The
remaining sections are referred to as the Constitution Act, 1982, including therein § 52
(1) which provides:
§ 52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any
law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent
of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
Section 52. (2) defines some thirty plus laws as part of the Constitution of Canada,
although only two-the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982-are
typically invoked.
3. HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 2 (Cambridge University Press 2008).
4. Id.
5. Canadian Charter, supra note 1, at §§ 15 and 28:
§ 15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
§ 15. (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or
economic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
§ 28. Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms
referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
The Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, also contains a third sex equality provision-
§ 35(4)-which guarantees aboriginal and treaty rights equally to male and female
persons; this section is not part of the Canadian Charter.
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construed as interpretive.6 In their litigation to date, women have relied
mainly on the former with varying degrees of success.7
Women do not always agree about the Charter rights that would
best protect their interests. Recently I conducted three studies that
illustrate some of these rights-based differences among women. The first
study focused on the prohibition of polygamy;8 the second, on the "ban"
on faith-based family arbitrations; 9 and the third, on the limit on the
accommodation of cultural differences. 10 While the recent controversies
about polygamy and faith-based family arbitrations began as issues of
religious freedom, the question of limiting cultural accommodations took
hold as an issue of entrenching sex equality in the provincial constitution.
Their origins aside, however, all three issues quickly became contests
between religious freedom and sex equality. Moreover, women could be
found on each side.
Initially, I referred to the women who support religious freedom as
religious women and those who support sex equality as feminists. This
characterization, however, poses several dilemmas. On the one hand, it
precludes recognition of religious women who self-identify as feminists.
On the other hand, it obscures the secularism of the feminists who refuse
to give priority to religious freedom. Put differently, abandoning
feminist proponents of religious freedom contributes to the feminist
deficit; while subscribing to "feminism unmodified" ignores serious
fissures among the feminists who support sex equality, a critique
addressed to Catharine MacKinnon when she advocated this discourse."
After some reflection, I re-conceptualized these women as
feminists. On the one hand, I chose not to disrespect the feminist
credentials of women who support religious freedom. On the other hand,
I opted to constrain the open-ended credentials of feminists who support
6. See Beverley Baines, Section 28 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: A Purposive Interpretation, 17 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 55-80 (2005).
7. See Beverley Baines, Using the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to
Constitute Women, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 48-74 (Beverley
Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds. 2004).
8. Martha Bailey, Beverley Baines, Bita Amani, & Amy Kaufman, Expanding
Recognition of Foreign Polygamous Marriages: Policy Implications for Canada, 25
NAT'L J. CONST. L. 83 (2009).
9. Beverley Baines, Must Feminists Identify as Secular Citizens: Lessons from
Ontario, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 94-95
(Linda C. McClain and Joanna Grossman eds., 2009) [hereinafter Baines, Lessons from
Ontario].
10. Beverley Baines, Must Feminists Support Entrenchment of Sex Equality: Lessons
from Quebec, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 137-56 (Susan H. Williams ed., 2009).
11. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 36 (President and Fellows of Harvard College 1987).
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sex equality. Applying this approach in the course of my faith-based
family arbitration and cultural accommodation research resulted in re-
casting religious women as religious feminists and feminists who support
sex equality as secular feminists. Applied retroactively to polygamy, it
means portraying the women who support or oppose polygamy as
religious and secular feminists respectively.
One consequence of adopting these new characterizations pertains
to feminist theory. Sharing the same label, even if only in part, suggests
religious and secular feminists should seek structures and strategies that
enable them to engage with each other. From the perspective of this
paper, however, the consequence that matters more involves
constitutionalism. Because religious feminists are defined by the priority
they give to religious freedom over sex equality, while secular feminists
give priority to sex equality over religious freedom, they all subscribe to
one of two Charter norms. Therefore, they can invoke these norms to
access the constitutional arena.
In addition, religious feminists and secular feminists have at least
limited access to constitutionalism's structural terrain. Irrespective of
whether they are parties to Charter litigation or whether they must accept
religious leaders or government spokespersons arguing on their behalf,
their issues will be placed before the courts, however imperfectly. While
it is very unlikely that religious or secular feminists would have designed
the constitutional regime that the Canadian Charter offers, neither can it
be said by either feminist group that its norms and structures lack any
utility for them.
Religious and secular feminist accounts, however, do not represent
all there is to say about the constitutional challenges that feminists might
raise when the state criminalizes polygamy, bans faith-based family
arbitrations, or uses sex equality to limit the accommodation of cultural
differences. Even though religious and secular feminists monopolized
the airwaves, in each case there were other feminists whose narratives
were ignored. While varied, these narratives had one feature in common:
all refused to give priority to religion over equality or to equality over
religion.' 2 They denied religious feminists their religious freedom trump
card, and they denied secular feminists their sex equality trump card.
Instead, these other feminists spoke of wanting both, simultaneously and
equally.
Recovering these voices was an unanticipated outcome of the
individual research projects that I undertook. This paper presents the
first opportunity to assess their collective significance. First, I need to
12. See, e.g., Baines, Lessons from Ontario, supra note 9 at 97 n.96; Baines, Lessons
from Quebec, supra note 10, at 148-50.
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name the feminists who delivered these narratives. There is a tendency
to refer to them, or at least to the ones who materialized in the faith-
based family arbitrations and cultural accommodations contexts, as
multicultural feminists. Canadians have a good reason for using this
terminology given the existence of a multiculturalism provision in the
Canadian Charter.1 3 Nevertheless I resist it (for reasons that will be
revealed in the course of this paper) and adopt instead the discourse of
intersectionalism. Thus, I maintain the missing narratives are those of
intersectional feminists.
My objective is to explore the question of whether these
intersectional feminists should have access to the promise of
constitutionalism. I begin pragmatically, setting out the normative and
structural barriers that exclude their narratives from existing (polygamy)
or potential (faith-based family arbitration or cultural accommodation)
Charter litigation. Next, I move to the realm of feminist theory-
specifically to exemplars of liberal, postcolonial, and deliberative
feminism-to outline the responses of Susan Moller Okin, 14 Leti
Volpp,15 and Madhavi Sunder 16 to the issue of the constitutional
recognition of intersectional feminism. I argue that these theories may
work for multiculturalism, but they are either too confrontational or not
sufficiently confrontational to work for intersectionalism. While
deliberative feminism is the most promising, it is also the most illusory
given its reliance on dialogue's potential in the political realm, and/or
dialogue laced with rules in the legal realm. Ultimately, I conclude that
the impermeability of its normative and strategic barriers deprive
constitutionalism of utility for intersectional feminists. Given the allure
of its promise, in short, Canadian constitutionalism is bad for
intersectional feminists.
CHARTER CONSTITUTIONALISM
Like many other bills of rights in Western democracies, the
Canadian Charter limits state action but not the activities of private
individuals or groups.' 7 To launch a challenge, a party must persuade a
13. Canadian Charter, supra note 1, § 27:
§ 27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.
14. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is
MULTICuLTuRALIsM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7-24 (Joshua Cohen, Michael Howard, & Martha
Nussbaum eds. 1999).
15. Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. Rev. 1181
(2001).
16. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003).
17. See Canadian Charter, supra note 1, § 32 (1) which provides:
§ 32. (1) This Charter applies
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court that state action violates a guaranteed right or freedom. The
Canadian Charter does not protect every conceivable right or freedom,
some significant omissions being property rights, and social and
economic rights. Moreover, unlike the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Canadian
Charter explicitly provides governments with the opportunity to justify
violating rights and freedoms.' 8 When a governmental justification is
successful, the constitutionality of the impugned law is upheld.
This part sets out how the three traditional components of any
Charter challenge-state action, rights violation, and government
justification-function in the context of the polygamy prohibition, the
faith-based family arbitration ban, and the limit on the accommodation of
cultural differences. It concludes by locating multiculturalism's role in
these Charter controversies.
State Action
Canada is a federation of 10 provinces and three territories with a
national government. The three controversial laws were enacted by two
different levels of government: Canada (polygamy) and two provinces,
Ontario (faith-based family arbitration) and Quebec (cultural
accommodation). 19
The Crime of Polygamy
Canada enacted the criminal law prohibiting polygamy almost 120
years ago. 20 As supportive legislative statements of that day make clear,
the intention was primarily religious; it was to keep American Mormons,
or more accurately break-away American Mormon sects, out of
Canada. 2' Given the continued existence throughout the intervening
years of at least two break-away American Mormon (a.k.a. the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints)
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within
the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory
and the Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters
within the authority of each province.
18. Id., § 1, which provides:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
19. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 293 (1985); Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch.
17, § 1 (1991); Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, § 50.1 (2010),
available at http://www/canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-c-12/latest/rsq-c-c-12.html
[hereinafter Quebec Charter].
20. See Bailey et al., supra note 8, at 110.
21. Seeid.at1ll.
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settlements in the western Canadian provinces of British Columbia and
Alberta, this objective was never met.
One of these colonies, Bountiful in British Columbia, is the primary
focal point for current anti-polygamy Charter litigation. In early 2009,
after nearly 60 years without any prosecutions of the crime of polygamy,
the Attorney General in British Columbia charged two Bountiful men-
Winston Blackmore and James Oler-with committing this crime, only
to have the charges dismissed for prosecutorial irregularities.22
Seemingly pushed to the wall, the provincial Attorney General then
turned to the provincial Constitutional Question Act to initiate a
reference case.23 That is, he asked the provincial Superior Court to give
an opinion on the constitutionality of the Criminal Code provision
prohibiting polygamy.24
The Attorney General had the option of initiating this reference case
either at the level of the provincial Supreme Court or at the provincial
Court of Appeal. Virtually all previous reference cases in Canada,
including those initiated in British Columbia began at the appellate level.
Under these circumstances the Attorney General felt compelled to justify
his choice of forum. "Pursuing a reference though B.C. Supreme Court,"
states a Ministry of the Attorney General press release, "gives us the
option to introduce evidence and witnesses, which will put a human face
on polygamy in contrast to the more abstract nature of a reference to the
B.C. Court of Appeal., 25 This seemed to indicate that the province is
open to hearing not only from secular feminists but also from
intersectional feminists.
22. Blackmore v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2009] B.C.S.C. 1299
(Can.).
23. Constitutional Question Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 68 (1996).
24. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 293, which provides:
293. (1) Every one who
(a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise
or enter into
(i) any form of polygamy, or
(ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same
time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of
marriage, or
(b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent
that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or
(ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years.
25. British Columbia Ministry of the Attorney General, Province to Seek Supreme
Court Opinion on Polygamy, Statement 2009AG0012-000518 (October 22, 2009),
available at http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/newsreleases_2009-2013/2009AG0012-000
518.pdf.).
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The "Ban" on Faith-based Family Arbitration
The Province of Ontario passed legislation "banning" faith-based
family arbitrations three years ago. This law came about because in the
early 1990's a Canadian Muslim lawyer, Syed Mumtaz Ali, began a
campaign to establish Shari'a arbitration tribunals to decide family and
personal status matters. 26  Ontario's Arbitration Act,27 much to the
surprise of many secular feminists, allowed courts to enforce the awards
of arbitration tribunals in the context of family matters. Moreover,
arbitrators could apply the law of whatever regime the parties agreed
upon, including religious law.28 By 2003 the NGO that Ali led, the
Canadian Society of Muslims, was pressing forward to set up his
proposed private arbitration tribunal-the Islamic Court of Justice-
which he and they insisted should be mandatory for all believing
Muslims who have to deal with matters consequent upon family
breakdown.
A firestorm of protest erupted, led by secular feminists. The
controversy escalated to the point where the provincial premier felt
compelled to appoint a one-woman inquiry commission. Headed by a
former provincial Attorney General, Marion Boyd, the commission
issued a lengthy report recommending that faith-based family arbitration
tribunals continue but become subject to regulation.29 This report did not
quell the controversy, which finally moderated only after the premier
announced a ban on faith-based family arbitrations.
30
The notion of a "ban" is not precisely accurate. According to the
legislation, faith-based family arbitration awards are not enforceable in
the civil courts unless they are consistent with the law of Ontario or
another Canadian jurisdiction. 31 Thus what was cast as a "ban" does not
mean that faith-based family arbitrations are outlawed. Rather, it means
that the parties to such arbitrations are vulnerable to the power dynamics
that they import, as critics of the "ban" have been quick to point out.
Since the province passed the legislation limiting faith-based family
arbitrations, the requisite state action is in place for a Charter challenge.
Despite threats by critics to challenge its constitutionality, no challenge
26. See Baines, Lessons from Ontario, supra note 9, at 85-6.
27. Arbitration Act, supra note 19, § 1.
28. Id. at § 32.
29. Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting
Inclusion (2004), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/
pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf.
30. Press Release, Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario Passes Family
Statute Law Amendment Act, (Feb. 15, 2006) available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.
gov.on.ca/english/news/2006/20060215-famend.asp.
31. Arbitration Act, supra note 19, § 2.2.
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has been forthcoming. Nevertheless, in what follows I develop a
hypothetical challenge, one that could follow the precedent set by the
polygamy reference, though unlikely. Rather, if there were a challenge,
it would probably come from a party dissatisfied by a court's refusal to
enforce an arbitration award because of inconsistency with Ontario or
Canadian law. Either way it will be difficult to see how intersectional
feminists might become parties.
The Limit on Accommodation of Cultural Differences
In 2008, the Province of Quebec entrenched a second sex equality
guarantee in the provincial Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.
32
This legislation was the culmination of years of debate over the extent to
which the residents of this predominantly francophone province were
willing to accommodate the cultural differences of ethnic and religious
communities that had grown up as a result of significant levels of
immigration.33  Francophone Quebecers traditionally understood
themselves to be a cultural minority in Canada. Their tolerance for the
recent claims of cultural difference by other minorities is often sorely
tested and stretched thin.
In February 2007 the tensions were such that the premier
established a provincial Consultation Commission on Accommodation
Practices Related to Cultural Differences with a mandate to make
recommendations that would ensure accommodation practices related to
cultural differences conformed to Quebec's six core values. 34 The Order
in Council identified "the equality of women and men" as a core value
along with "the separation of church and State, the primacy of the French
language, the protection of rights and freedoms, justice and the rule of
law, the protection of minorities, and the rejection of discrimination and
racism".35 By the time that the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, named
after its co-chairmen, issued its Final Report in May 2008, however, the
province was in the final stages of amending the Quebec Charter to
36include the second sex equality provision.
Both the provincial politicians and secular feminists who supported
entrenching the guarantee of sex equality believe it should function as a
32. Quebec Charter, supra note 19, § 50.1. This was first passed as R.S.Q. ch. 15,
§ 2 (2008) and provides, "The rights and freedoms set forth in this Charter are guaranteed
equally to women and men."
33. See Baines, supra note 10.
34. Quebec, Order in Council, No. 95-2007, Feb. 8, 2007.
35. Id.
36. Gerard Bouchard & Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for
Reconciliation, (Quebec, May 2008) available at http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/
documentation/rapports/rapport-final-integral-en.pdf.
2010]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
limitation on the accommodation of cultural differences. In particular,
they think women need protection from the cultural and religious
practices of some minorities. Whether the sex equality guarantee will
serve this purpose depends on two factors. First, are the impugned
practices prohibitive or permissive? To give two examples: Are public
school teachers prohibited from veiling, or permitted to veil? Are
birthing mothers prohibited from demanding a female obstetrician or
permitted to have one? Second, depending on the answer to the first
question, who are the women who are entitled to protection under the
second sex equality provision?
If public school teachers are prohibited from veiling in classrooms
37 38(or in courtrooms, or when voting, or upon applying for drivers
licenses requiring photo-id39), or if birthing mothers cannot demand a
female obstetrician, then the government has taken the side of secular
feminists, forcing religious feminists to launch a challenge under the
Quebec Charter. Alternatively, if the government permits teachers to
wear the veil in classrooms and birthing mothers to demand female
obstetricians, the challenges would come from secular feminists who
believe that these accommodations of cultural differences are
unconstitutional because they stereotype women as subordinate and
vulnerable. Because there is little likelihood of this alternative occurring,
in the remainder of this paper I will address the former (prohibitive)
scenario. Moreover, my arguments must be hypothetical because no
such challenge has yet been launched. As with the cases of polygamy
and faith-based family arbitrations, so too with the amendment of the
Quebec Charter to require sex equality in cases involving the
accommodation of cultural differences, no self-evident role for
intersectional feminists emerges.
37. See R. v. N.S., [2009] Can LII 21203 (ON S.C.) (Can.) available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2009/2009canlii21203/2009canlii21203.html
(finding no blanket right for veiled Muslim woman who is victim of sexual assault to
wear veil while testifying).
38. See Tu Thanh Ha, Igrid Peritz, & Bertrand Marotte, Lift face veils or don't vote,
Quebec tells Muslims, The Globe and Mail (Mar. 24, 2007) available at
http://www.religionnewsblog.com/17804/lift-face-veils-or-dont-vote-quebec-tells-
muslims. This ruling was reversed. See also Barry Artiste, Quebec Voting Rules:
Niqabs, Burkas, Veils Allowed (Sept. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.nowpublic.com/quebec-voting-rules-niqabs-burkas-veils-allowed.
39. See Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.C. 37 (Can.)
(finding that photo ID requirement for drivers licenses violated Hutterites religious
freedom but violation justified by need to protect identity theft).
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Rights Violations
In each context, the right asserted will be to freedom of religion.4 °
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has kept the test for
violating religious freedom very simple. Both belief and practice are
protected; the Court will not go behind the assertion that a belief or
practice is religious; and the most a claimant might be expected to show
is sincerity of belief, but religious obligation is not necessary.4 1 It may
come as some surprise to lawyers in other jurisdictions, or to non-
lawyers, but proving a violation of religious freedom is far from being
the most difficult feature of the Charter litigation process in Canada (or
Quebec).
Criminalizing Polygamy
Most practitioners of polygamy do so for religious reasons, whether
those reasons derive from Christianity, Islam or Judaism. The prime
Christian exponents are Mormons and the break-away Mormons known
as members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter
Day Saints. In Islam, some Muslims practice polygamy with up to four
wives because the Quran permits it. Only a very small ultra conservative
Jewish sect admits to polygamy and only under circumstances where the
first wife is unable to conceive a child. In addition there are some
customary African practices that include polygamy and are likely
attributable in their origins if not contemporaneously to religious
influences. In the face of such pervasive religiosity, courts would have
no basis for denying polygamy the attribute of being a religious practice.
And given the practice, the fact that the Canadian government
criminalizes it with a sanction of up to five years incarceration qualifies
as a violation of religious freedom.
42
"Banning" Faith-based Family Arbitrations
When Ontario amended the Arbitration Act in 2008 to deny legal
effect to arbitration awards that are not consistent with Ontario or other
Canadian law, the impact was felt mainly by religious believers.
40. Canadian Charter, supra note 1, § 2 (a) which provides:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion
Quebec Charter, supra note 19, § 3 provides:
3. Every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including...
freedom of religion.
41. See, e.g., Syndicat Northcrest v. Anselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.); Bruker v.
Marcovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.).
42. See Bailey et al., supra note 8 at 108.
2010]
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Christians, Jews and Muslims all require religious recognition of
marriage breakdown and, as a consequence, impose a variety of rules
pertaining to property division, support, and/or custody of children.
Some features of these regimes are not consistent with Ontario or other
Canadian law. Thus any religious believers who resort to the civil courts
to enforce an inconsistent rule would be denied protection, and hence
have grounds for claiming violation of religious freedom.
Limiting Accommodation of Cultural Differences
Although the public discourse in Quebec was of cultural differences
and their accommodation, it was obvious from examples given in the
press and to a slightly lesser extent in the Bouchard-Taylor Report that
the objective was not so much accommodation as limitation of
accommodation. It also appeared that the main targets were adherents of
Islamic religions; islamophobia was alive and well. Still Jewish
differences surfaced, with one private law case going to the Supreme
Court of Canada.43 Another Canadian Supreme Court case from Quebec
involved a Sikh school boy wearing a miniature kirpan."
Finally, on one occasions even a Protestant (but never Catholics,
Quebec is a province of many Catholic adherents) was denied
accommodation until she went to court. This case involved the
application of a married woman who wanted to change her surname to
that of her husband.45 Since 1981, the Civil Code of Quebec has
prohibited women from changing their surname on marriage; a married
woman must exercise all of her legal rights under her birth name.46 The
wife challenged this provision on the grounds of her Christian religious
conviction, contending that as a Baptist she had to take her husband's
surname to publicly demonstrate family unity. The Quebec Superior
Court judge, a woman, decided in her favour, hence accommodating her
religious belief.
If we consider the two hypothetical cases mentioned earlier, the
school teacher prohibited from wearing a veil in the classroom and the
birthing mother denied a female obstetrician, assuming state action was
implicated the Charter challenge would rely on the invocation of
religious freedom. Both situations derive from religious beliefs about the
43. See Syndicat Northcrest v. Anselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.).
44. Multani v. Marguerite-Bourgeois (Commission Scholaire), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256
(Can.).
45. Gabriel v. Directeur de l'6tat civil, [2005] Q.J. no. 145 (Can.).
46. Act to Establish a New Civil Code and to Reform Family Law, 1980 S.Q., ch.
39, § I (Can.), now Article 442 of the Civil Code of Quebec ("In marriage, each spouse
retains his surname and given names, and exercises his civil rights under this surname
and these given names.").
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role of women and the requirements of modesty and privacy. Being
forced to remove the veil or not teach and to accept a male obstetrician
violate these religious beliefs.
Government Justifications
Although it is relatively easy to prove a rights violation, establishing
a government justification is more complex. Governments must show
that the legislative objective is rational-i.e., compelling, rationally
connected to the means, and minimally impairing of the right in issue-
and proportional to the rights infringement.47 In each case, governments
will assert that the justification is the promotion of sex equality. They
will, in other words, speak on behalf of secular feminists, whether
accurately or not.
Justifying the Crime
Canada, or the British Columbia Attorney General in the reference
case, will have difficulty justifying the necessity of criminalizing
polygamy. Not only is there a serious question about the objective of the
criminal code provision which, when it was first enacted in the 1890s,
was aimed at the exclusion of break-away Mormons rather than being
expressed in any terms that resembled an understanding of sex equality.
But even granting that the government can claim polygamy continues to
be criminalized to protect women and children, there is a major
controversy over whether polygamy harms them.48 And if that hurdle is
overcome, there is the further question of whether the better solution is
not to criminalize polygamy but simply not to legalize it. Criminalizing
a religious belief on the questionable grounds of sex equality may not
meet the proportionality test.
At the end of this brief assessment of the polygamy litigation, what
can be said with clarity is that both religious feminists and secular
feminists will hear their arguments made in the courtroom, even though
they may not be the ones expressing them. The Attorney General has the
responsibility for advancing the sex equality argument. The provincial
Constitutional Question Act under the rubric of which this reference case
is lodged, also permits the court to "direct that a person interested, or, if
there is a class of persons interested, any one or more persons as
47. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
48. See Lori G. Beaman, Response: Who Decides? Harm, Polygamy and Limits on
Freedom, 10 NOVA RELIGIO 43 (2006); Angela Campbell, Listen to the Women of
Bountiful: In the name of the mothers, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 10, 2009;
Daphne Bramham, The hard evidence ofpolygamy's damage is bountiful, VANCOUVER
SUN, Nov. 14, 2009.
2010]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
representatives of that class, must be notified of the hearing, and those
persons are entitled to be heard."49 Hopefully, this provision mandates
notification of the religious leaders in Bountiful (but query whether it
would extend to adherents of the other religions that practice polygamy)
who would in theory present arguments to which religious feminists
might subscribe.
The Constitutional Question Act provision may not be generous
enough, however, to extend to notification of intersectional feminists.
For one reason, they might be perceived as unable to make a coherent
structural argument because they refuse to shelter under only one of the
Charter's rights-bearing provisions. For another, the Court may ignore
the normative significance of making connections between religious
freedom and sex equality, preferring to treat them traditionally as
contested rights.
Justifying the "Ban"
Unlike the government litigators in the polygamy context, those in
the context of the limitations on faith-based family arbitrations would
have little difficulty convincing a court that the objective of the
legislation is to protect women's equality rights. There is a serious
conviction abroad that religious regimes penalize women, particularly in
the context of marriage breakdowns.50 Proponents of religious freedom
would have an uphill fight to convince a court that religious tenets should
be civilly enforceable.
As a recent study suggests, there are two different categories of
judicial response to religious-based claims for recognition: "diversity as
inclusion," which stands a fair chance of success, and "non-state law as
competition," which in Canada has not found favour with the judiciary.51
In the context of the faith-based family arbitration controversy, religious
feminists would seek the latter, and neither they nor the religious leaders
who would express their arguments have laid the groundwork for
convincing judges that sex equality would not be disproportionately
harmed by permitting competing religious regimes. In fact, the best
evidence might come from intersectional feminists, but again, they are
without any way of persuading a court to hear their intervention because
they refuse to take an either-or position on the contested values.
49. Constitutional Question Act, supra note 23, § 5.
50. See M.C. Lam, Multicultural Feminism: Cultural Concerns, INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 10163, 10164 (2001)
(referring to belief of many liberal feminists that non-Westem immigrant communities
oppress or discriminate against women).
51. Ayelet Shachar & Ran Hirschl, The New Wall of Separation: Permitting
Diversity, Restricting Competition, 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 2535 (2009).
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Justifying Cultural Limitations
Like the Ontario government, the Quebec government would have
little difficulty with the objective of the entrenched sex equality
provision, namely to guarantee rights to women. Nevertheless the
hypothetical situations are troubling because they present scenarios of
women disagreeing with women.
More specifically, when the guarantee of sex equality is invoked
against their wishes, veiled teachers and birthing mothers are told that
they do not count as feminists. They are told that secular feminist beliefs
trump those of religious feminists, mostly likely in litigation wherein the
most audible voices are male-male religious leaders railing against
male government spokespersons. What intersectional feminists try to
offer in this contest is the connecting or bundling of the rights being
fought over, to come to a better understanding of how both can survive.
Yet again the question is how they can get into courts that refuse to
recognize intersectional rights.
Multiculturalism
Does multiculturalism offer a constitutional podium from which
intersectional feminists might speak? While I am reluctant to dismiss
any strategy that might open doors for these feminists, I am wary of
multiculturalism for three particular reasons.
First, in Canada the history of multiculturalism is a history that
focused on ethnicity and race. The concept of multiculturalism was
raised initially in the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism. 52 Countering biculturalism was on the minds of the
politicians who reviewed that Report, not religion. Ultimately these
politicians agreed to incorporate a multiculturalism provision in the
Canadian Charter, albeit not as a right.53  In addition, Canada
subsequently enacted a Multiculturalism Act in 1988 but religion played
no significant role in its passage.54 Thus, religion is a latecomer to the
multicultural scene. When multiculturalism was engaged as a concept, it
was primarily to encourage immigrant minorities to celebrate the social
features of their cultural diversity while still participating in the larger
Canadian society.
52. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISM,
vol. IV, 12-13 (1967) (Can.).
53. See Canadian Charter, supra note 1.
54. See Canadian Multiculturalism Act, S.C. 1988, c. 31 s. 3 (referring to
multiculturalism policy in terms of the "cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society"
without any mention of religion).
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The second reason pertains specifically to the multicultural
provision that is contained in the Canadian Charter. Courts treat it as an
interpretive provision, meaning it does not have the same impact as a
rights-bearing provision.55 As an interpretive provision, courts treat it as
working in tandem with other provisions. While there is little
jurisprudence developing the potential of this provision, what there is
tends to treat it as working in tandem with religious freedom. This
reinforcement may appeal to religious feminists but it does not engage
either secular or intersectional feminists.
Thirdly, if multiculturalism is to have potential for intersectional
feminists, then it becomes important to understand which model it
promotes because there are at least two competing models. As was noted
above, one way that has been proposed to describe these models is
"diversity in inclusion" and "non-state law as competition." A simpler
depiction would be assimilation (a.k.a. "republican integration") or
diversity. Irrespective of which terminology is chosen, the three
religious restrictions examined in this paper are more consistent with the
former model, namely "diversity in inclusion" or assimilation. As such
multiculturalism might appeal to secular feminists. Religious feminists,
on the other hand, would prefer the alternative model, one that
decriminalizes (or even legalizes) polygamy, supports civil enforcement
of faith-based family arbitrations, and respects cultural accommodations.
In sum, Canadian multiculturalism comes with a history that does
not include respect for religious differences. Nevertheless, this neglect
has been displaced by recent curial interpretations that align
multiculturalism with religious freedom. When this alignment is
complemented by modeling exercises that require choice between
assimilation and diversity, intersectional feminists have good reason to
be wary because their options are too limited. In other words, if
multiculturalism is synonymous with intersectionalism, current
approaches to multiculturalism would force intersectional feminists to
choose between becoming religious or secular feminists.
FEMINIST THEORY
Before explaining how feminist theorists conceptualize
intersectionality, I intend to review their responses to the dilemma of
feminists who want to have a voice in constitutional conflicts involving
religion and sex equality. Not surprisingly, theorists have responded in
many ways. Nevertheless, I propose to collapse their responses into
55. Joan Small, Multiculturalism, Equality, and Canadian Constitutionalism:
Cohesion and Difference, in MULTICULTURALISM AND THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 196-
211 (Stephen Tiemey ed. 2007).
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three main categories: liberal, postcolonial, and deliberative. In what
follows, Susan Moller Okin represents the liberal feminist response; Leti
Volpp offers the postcolonial feminist response, and Madhavi Sunder
provides the deliberative feminist response.
Although they all theorize multicultural feminism, I argue that only
Sunder goes some distance to engaging the concerns of intersectional
feminists. Moreover, because they mostly use the discourse of
multiculturalism or multicultural feminism, I intend to put aside my
reservations about this term to review their theories. Still, I am not
convinced that multiculturalism is synonymous or interchangeable with
intersectionalism. In the final section, I return to this distinction.
Susan Moller Okin
Susan Moller Okin confronted multiculturalism head-on in a very
well-known paper entitled "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" and
published in the late 1990s. 56 She defined feminism as "the belief that
women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they should be
recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and the
opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely chosen lives as men can."
57
58By equating women to men and seeking to improve their opportunities,
Okin's discourse placed her squarely in the liberal feminist camp.59
She defined multiculturalism as "the claim.., that minority cultures
or ways of life are not sufficiently protected by ensuring the individual
rights of their members and as a consequence should also be protected
with special group rights or privileges." 60 Her objective was to critique
Will Kymlicka's liberal justification of special group rights for cultural
minorities. 6' According to her critique, these rights "may not be in the
best interests of the girls and women of the culture." 62 Okin then argued
that they should not be granted unless young women (older women being
already co-opted) "are fully represented in negotiations about group
rights. 63
Okin believed these young women would argue for sex equality. 4
In other words, her approach was to juxtapose multiculturalism and sex
56. See Okin, supra note 14.
57. Id. at 10.
58. See id.
59. See Bonnie Honig, Complicating Culture, BOSTON REVIEW (1997),
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR22.5/honig.html (last visited Jan 11, 2010).
60. Okin, supra note 14, at 10-11.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 24.
64. See id. at 23-24.
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equality. 65 Typically liberal and secular feminist, her approach offers
little recourse to religious feminists and none whatsoever to
intersectional feminists. As an aside, those secular feminists who admit
to sharing Okin's views should disapprove of the Canadian Charter
because it addresses multiculturalism (and religious freedom) without
unambiguously ascribing priority to sex equality.66  Even those who
supported entrenching the second sex equality provision in the Quebec
Charter were unable to forestall the possibility of this ambiguity arising
in the courts.67
Leti Volpp
Okin did not lack critics, and one of the most sustained criticisms
was delivered by Leti Volpp.68  Volpp rejected Okin's approach of
positing multiculturalism and feminism as oppositional.69  Not only
minority cultures encompass feminist values; "gender-subordinating
values are also valued in the dominant culture of the West.,
70
Commenting on the "problematic aggregation of very different
assertions about culture ' 71, Volpp suggested that it had "forestalled
constructive discussion.
7 2
Worse, the discourse of feminism versus multiculturalism to which
Okin subscribed represents feminist colonialism. 73 Feminists using this
discourse assume "that women in minority communities require
liberation into the 'progressive' social customs of the West.,
74
Positioning minority women as "other" denies them agency and the
"potential to be understood as emancipatory subjects., 75  Volpp
particularly opposes the liberal feminist movement's focus on "violence
against women;" her postcolonial roots lead her to advocate turning
feminist attention to women's "material well-being. 76
In sum, for Volpp the binary discourse of feminism versus
multiculturalism "obscures the forces that actually shape culture, hides
what forces beyond culture impact women's lives, denies that women
have agency within patriarchy, and elides the level of violence intrinsic
65. See Okin, supra note 14, at 23-24.
66. See Canadian Charter, supra note 1, § 27.
67. See Quebec Charter, supra note 19, § 50.1
68. See Volpp, supra note 15, at 1181-84.
69. See id. at 1183-84.
70. Id. at 1192-93.
71. Id. at 1195.
72. Id.
73. See Volpp, supra note 15, at 1195-96.
74. Id. at 1198.
75. Id. at 1205
76. Id. at 1210.
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to the United States., 77  Enhancing our understanding of
multiculturalism, she portrayed cultures as not only "patriarchal-not
more or less so, but differently patriarchal ... [and] characterized by
resistance to patriarchy. 78  And she sought to "broaden and shift
79
feminist values by challenging feminists to abandon their notion of the
"unitary female subject ' 80 and their "strong desire for innocence.",81
We are left with a nagging question: did Volpp, the postcolonial
feminist, ultimately take the opposite turn from Okin, the liberal
feminist? Okin expanded upon the necessity of feminism winning the
contest with multiculturalism. 82 In contrast, did Volpp collapse feminism
into multiculturalism, albeit only in "particular contexts? '83  Put
differently, did she offer secular feminists any structural possibilities for
keeping the norm of sex equality viable in multicultural (or religious
freedom) contexts? Absent such structures, intersectional feminists
would also have cause for concern.
Madhavi Sunder
Madhavi Sunder was also critical of Okin's approach.84 Unlike
Volpp, however, she chose to focus on religion and not on
multiculturalism. 85  In the context of the United States where
multiculturalism is not embedded in the Constitution or even in
legislation, Volpp was forced to treat its social and communal
manifestations as problematic.86 Sunder, on the other hand, had the
advantage of invoking religion's legal construction, primarily in the U.S.
87Constitution. Rather than appearing to be critical of multiculturalism or
religion as they manifest in minority communities, therefore, she was
free to define the problem in terms of law's approach to religion.88
More specifically, Sunder attributed most of the difficulty to one
branch of law, namely human rights law which treats religion "as a
sovereign, extralegal jurisdiction," that is, as "natural, irrational,
incontestable, and imposed. ' 89 Human rights law wrongly defers to this
77. Id. at 1185.
78. Volpp, supra note 15, at 1217.
79. Id. at 1184.
80. Id. at 1199.
81. Id. at 1214.
82. See generally Okin, supra note 14, at 10-12.
83. Volpp, supra note 15, at 1217.
84. See Sunder, supra note 16, at 1402.
85. See id.
86. See Volpp, supra note 15, at 1212-14.
87. See Sunder, supra note 16, at 1402.
88. See id.
89. Id.
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construction of religion as "other," accepting and expecting inequality. 90
She argued, "human rights law, not religion, is the problem."9'
Nevertheless, Sunder did not let religious and cultural authorities
completely off the hook.92 She was critical of those who failed "to
imagine religious community on more egalitarian and democratic
terms. 93 In this respect her argument resembled that of Volpp, as did
her contention that feminists should pay close attention to the work of
women's human rights activists in minority communities.94 In particular,
Sunder lauded women's human rights activists in Muslim countries who
"increasingly refuse to choose between religion and rights and demand
both.
95
Is human rights law up to the task of marrying religion and sex
equality? After all, if human rights law is problematic because of the
way it constructs religion, can it also become part of the solution? This
implication is conveyed by Sunder's reliance on women's human rights
activists to make a difference.96 Relying on the fact that these activists
are women blurs the question of which legal rights they advocate. Do
they represent the norm of sex equality, and hence should be regarded as
secular feminists? Or, because their work transpires within religious
communities, should they be seen as religious feminists?
Or again, might they embody intersectional feminism and, if so,
how would their embodiment manifest legally? Like Volpp, Sunder
rejects binaries and, because her work focuses on Muslim countries, it
creates the appearance of collapsing sex equality into religion.97 Sunder
is adamant, however, about the importance of pursuing both freedom and
equality "within private, cultural spaces as well as public ones." 98 What
is required to transpose her arguments for the pursuit of both freedom
and equality into diasporic public spaces? Whatever the answer, it
cannot be found in Canada's Charter, as its failure to offer normative and
structural accommodation to intersectional feminists exemplifies. 99
Canada's Charter would need to be re-designed to accommodate
narratives that combine sex equality and religious freedom without
collapsing them.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 1403.
92. See Sunder, supra note 16, at 1403.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1412.
96. See idat 1403-04, 1443-44.
97. See Sunder, supra note 16, at 1403-04.
98. Id. at 1471.
99. See Canadian Charter, supra note 1, § 27.
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Intersectionality
The concept of intersectionality was introduced in the United States
to address "the multidimensionality of black woman's women's
experience."'00 Maintaining anti-discrimination law imposed a single-
axis notion of identity that treated black women as either black or
female, Kimberl& Crenshaw proposed the concept of intersectionality to
account for their multiple identities.' 01 Others expanded her approach to
encompass anti-discrimination claims by Asian women, 10 2 Latino
women, 10 3 and African-American men.104  In Canada, Nitya Duclos
applied it to her study of human rights cases involving race and sex
discrimination.10 5 These studies and others illustrate the rich and diverse
history of intersectionality in the context of race.
Should this concept be applied in the context of religion? Put
differently, is there any reason to refrain from applying intersectionality
to engage religion and gender as intersecting axes? Insofar as
intersectionality looks "to forms of inequality that are routed through one
another, and which cannot be untangled to reveal a single cause,"
religion and gender appear to qualify. 10 6 In the three contexts elaborated
in this paper, the feminists described here as intersectional maintain their
inability to disentangle the religious and gendered roots of their
inequality. Another way to express the work of intersectionality is by
reference to its "challenge to essentialised concepts of identity and
disadvantage."'
0 7
In contrast, multiculturalism is an identity-essentializing concept
and not necessarily one that is focused on disadvantage.
Multiculturalism takes its direction from and relates to the world around
it. The consequence of combining multiculturalism with feminism, that
it becomes synonymous with religious feminism, may be idiosyncratic to
100. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-racist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
101. See id.
102. See Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using
Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of
Race, Gender, and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REv. 771, 772-73 (1996).
103. See Julissa Reynoso, Perspectives on Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, Gender
and Other Grounds: Latinas at the Margins, 7 HARV. LATiNo L. REv. 63, 69 (2004).
104. See D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered Title VII Plaintiff?: African-American
Males and Intersectional Claims, 86 NEB. L. REv. 552 (2008).
105. See Nitya Duclos, Disappearing Women: Racial Minority Women in Human
Rights Cases, 6 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 25 (1993).
106. INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND: LAW, POWER AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION
1 (Emily Grabham, Davine Cooper, Jane Krishnadas, & Didi Herman eds., 2009)
[hereinafter INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND].
107. Id. at 5.
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Canada. If it is, then multiculturalism may have the potential to perform
a different function in other national contexts. Indeed it may be defined
as synonymous not with religious feminism but rather with secular
feminism. What it lacks, however, is the potential to serve the anti-
essentialising function that intersectionality performs. Perhaps the
simplest difference between these concepts is that multiculturalism is
purely outward-looking, relating to the context around it;
intersectionality is inward-looking before it enters the larger frame
around it.
Intersectionality's downside, at least in the context of Canada's
Charter, is its inability to command a response from constitutional
decision-makers. This context is not unique. Many of the scholarly
contributors to a recent collection of papers on intersectionality have
reservations about its legal efficacy. While it draws "attention away
from static conceptions of social life and experience," it nevertheless
"presumes the gaps that it attempts to close."108 Deployed to indicate the
inherent limits of law, intersectionality is itself limited by the absence of
"an analysis that connects experiences of inequality with structures,
institutions and processes." 109 Most seriously, perhaps, intersectionality
is vulnerable to co-option because it "can be mobilized within legal
structures either in inadequate ways, or in ways that undermine its
foundational critical impulse."'1 10
Their critiques notwithstanding, many of these critics are not ready
to give up on intersectionality. The editors of the collection conclude
that "intersectionality is still useful as an anti-essentialist approach as
long as it is used in conjunction with a clear focus on institutions,
structural dynamics, and power."' 11 For now, therefore, I conclude that
intersectionality highlights a serious lacuna in the Canadian Charter, the
absence of normative and structural space for the narratives of feminists
who wish to advocate both religious freedom and sex equality.
CONCLUSION
In my earlier research, I concluded that the Canadian (and Quebec)
Charter(s) did not protect intersectional feminists. Whether these
feminists seek to intervene on the issue of de-criminalizing polygamy,
"banning" faith-based family arbitrations, or limiting the accommodation
of cultural differences, there are no constitutional norms and structures
through which they can express themselves. The Canadian and Quebec
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 2, 4.
110. Id. at 6.
111. INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND, supra note 106, at 14.
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Charters compel them to choose between their religious beliefs and their
belief in sex equality if they wish to intervene. Because they are not
willing to make this choice, the Charters silence them, rendering them
invisible to constitutional jurisprudence, never mind the world at large.
In Canada, constitutionalism does not protect intersectional feminists.
Do all written constitutions force this choice upon intersectional
feminists? Are there ways to redirect, even subvert if necessary, these
constitutions to secure respect and protection for the citizenship of
intersectional feminists whether it is in the context of the veil, obstetrics,
faith-based family arbitration, polygamy, etc.? Or must our constitutions
be redesigned to yield another fresh start, one in which contemporary
"gender awareness" is enhanced by the awareness of intersectionality? 12
112. IRVING, supra note 3.
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